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Auditor Switching for Opinion Shopping,  
and Subsequent Audit Quality and Audit Fee:  
Evidence from the Post-SOX Period* 
 
ABSTRACT: Theory suggests that firms engage in opinion shopping to obtain better audit 
opinions. However, there is scarce evidence on the economic consequences of the opinion 
shopping behaviors. In this paper, we examine the effect of auditor switches for opinion 
shopping on audit quality and audit fees. Using 30,333 firm-year observations over the 2004-
2012 period in the U.S., we first document evidence that firms switch their auditors in search 
for better audit opinions. Next, we find that the audit quality of clients that switch auditors for 
opinion shopping is significantly lower than that of clients that did not switch auditors or 
switched auditors for other purposes. Further tests reveal that these clients pay significantly 
higher audit fees to their successive auditors. Consequently, we provide compelling evidence 
that opinion shopping is detrimental to audit quality and auditor independence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
While auditor switches occur for various reasons such as a change in the demand for 
audit service, auditor-client mismatch, and an effort to reduce audit fee, some switches are 
suspected to be motivated by clients’ opinion shopping (i.e., shopping for an improved audit 
opinion from a successor auditor). Opinion shopping behavior has long received considerable 
attention from regulators worldwide since the behavior has serious implications for the 
credibility of audit opinions and auditor independence. For example, regulators in Canada 
(MacDonald Commission 1987), U.K. (Cadbury Commission 1992; Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales 2002) and European Union (European Commission 2010) 
express their respective concerns over opinion shopping. Recently European Commission 
(2010) and PCAOB (2011) discuss a possible introduction of mandatory auditor rotation to 
prevent opinion shopping and improve auditor independence. Despite regulators’ continuing 
concerns, anecdotal evidence indicates that there still exist actual auditor switches that appear 
to be related to opinion shopping.1 Therefore, several primitive questions will provide 
insights into the debate over public policy: Do audit clients successfully engage in opinion 
shopping in today’s audit environment? Does auditor switching for opinion shopping impair 
auditor independence and deteriorate subsequent audit quality? Do opinion shopping clients 
pay higher fees to successor auditors to provide economic incentives for a clean opinion? 
This study intends to address these crucial questions.      
Empirical results of prior research on the efficacy of opinion shopping are mixed and 
dated. While earlier studies compare pre- and post-switch audit opinions and find no 
association between switching to a new auditor and a subsequent improvement in the audit 
                                           
1 An example is Overstock.com which switched auditors from Grant Thornton to KPMG shortly after they 
replaced PWC with Grant Thornton in 2009. The case ignited controversy on the motivation of Overstock.com 
for changing their auditors frequently and raised intense concerns from the investment community over the 
possibility of opinion shopping. See ‘The auditor disagrees with overstock.com’ (New York Times, December 
29, 2009) for details. 
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opinion (Chow and Rice 1982; Krishnan 1994; Krishnan and Stephens 1995; Geiger et al. 
1998), Lennox (2000) argues that this evidence does not necessarily mean that opinion 
shopping is futile because an opinion shopping client is expected to compare the probability 
of receiving an unfavorable opinion from the incumbent auditor with the probability of 
receiving a more favorable opinion from the successor auditor. Thus, he tests for opinion 
shopping with UK data by predicting opinions that clients would have received if they had 
made switch decisions opposite to those that actually occur, and finds that clients would have 
received less favorable opinions had they made switch decisions opposite to those actually 
observed, consistent with successful opinion shopping.  
In this study, we first examine whether audit clients successfully engage in opinion 
shopping in recent audit environment, using the Lennox’s (2000) innovative methodology to 
identify opinion shopping.2 As discussed above, prior evidence on the efficacy of opinion 
shopping is dated, while audit environment dramatically changed after the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. In particular, if independent audit committees, which are 
now responsible for hiring auditors, make auditor switch decisions without opinion shopping 
consideration, the results documented by Lennox (2000) may not be observed in the post-
SOX period. On the other hand, managerial incentives to avoid unfavorable audit opinions 
may still indirectly affect auditor switch decisions if client firms appoint audit committee 
members that readily support hiring auditors preferred by managers. Therefore, whether 
clients successfully engage in opinion shopping in the post-SOX period is an open question. 
Second, we next examine how auditor switches motivated by opinion shopping are 
related to post-switch audit quality.3 Auditor switching for opinion shopping may occur 
                                           
2 Although earlier studies on opinion shopping examine all non-clean opinions, we focus on going concern 
opinions because a vast majority of non-clean opinions are going concern audit opinions.  
3 An inherent difficulty in this investigation is to separate auditor switches motivated by opinion shopping from 
other auditor switches. Auditor switching for opinion shopping is proxied by an indicator variable which is 1 if a 
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under two possibilities. Clients may switch auditors for opinion shopping when incumbent 
auditors are likely to issue a non-clean opinion due to their stricter threshold for a clean 
opinion, while the clients believe that the true economic circumstance of their firms does not 
necessarily warrant the issuance of a non-clean opinion. We call this possibility as ‘switching 
for a different view.’ Other clients may switch auditors to hire a less independent auditor who 
is more likely yield to client pressure to issue a clean opinion. These clients switch auditors 
because their incumbent auditors’ resistance to the client pressure is relatively higher. We call 
this alternative possibility as ‘switching for impaired independence.’4   
It is not clear whether the finding of Lennox (2000) is driven by the first type of 
auditor switches or the second type. Although both types of auditor switches may result in an 
improved audit opinion from successor auditors, their implications for subsequent audit 
quality are different. Under the first case (i.e., switching for a different view), a client’s desire 
to change auditors is not to exercise undue influence on audit quality; instead the client 
simply utilizes a possible disagreement between incumbent and successor auditor as to the 
type of opinion which the two auditors believe to be appropriate. In such a case, the 
implication of the auditor switches to subsequent audit quality is not straightforward. On the 
other hand, auditor switches in the second case (i.e., switching for impaired independence) 
are opportunistically motivated by clients who want to have a lower quality audit. If the 
clients successfully appoint an auditor who is more susceptible to the client pressure, it is 
reasonable to expect the lack of independence to be reflected in both egregious audit failure 
such as restatements and less egregious audit quality proxies such as the magnitude of 
                                                                                                                                   
client firm switches its auditor in anticipation of a lower probability of receiving a non-clean opinion from the 
successor auditor, and 0 otherwise, based on Lennox’s (2000) methodology. Please see Section III for details.   
4 While “opinion shopping” is often understood as the practice of changing auditors in order to get a desired 
audit opinion, regulators define it more broadly by referring it to “the search for an auditor willing to support a 
proposed accounting treatment designed to help a company achieve its reporting objectives even though that 
treatment might frustrate reliable reporting” (Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, 1988). This definition 
by SEC is more consistent with ‘switching for impaired independence.’ 
4 
 
discretionary accruals.  
Third, we also examine the relation between auditor switches for opinion shopping 
and subsequent audit fees. If the second type clients mostly induce auditor switching for 
opinion shopping, the clients may pay higher audit fees to successor auditors because the 
auditors will have few incentives to compromise independence if no fee premium is paid. On 
the contrary, if the first type is the dominant driver of auditor switching for opinion shopping, 
we may not observe a different level of audit fees, because the successor auditors are unlikely 
to demand such fee premium under this case. We explore these implications by identifying a 
group of auditor switches for opinion shopping with the Lennox’s methodology (i.e., auditor 
switches in anticipation of a higher probability of receiving a clean opinion from successor 
auditors) and then examining their subsequent audit quality and audit fees. 
Using 30,333 firm-year observations collected over the 2004 – 2010 period in the 
U.S., we empirically examine these issues. Among the total sample, 2,524 clients (firm-year 
observations) change auditors, while the remaining 27,809 clients do not. The empirical 
findings are summarized as follows. First, following Lennox’s (2000) method, we find 
evidence that U.S. firms do engage in opinion shopping even in the post-SOX period. Second, 
we find that clients that switch auditors for opinion shopping exhibit significantly lower audit 
quality, measured by the magnitude of discretionary accruals and the frequency of 
restatements, in the subsequent year than clients that did not switch auditors or switched 
auditors for other purposes. It implies that auditor switching decision is motivated by the 
client’s desire to appoint a less independent auditor who is more likely to yield to client 
pressure to issue a clean opinion. Third, the deterioration in audit quality is accompanied with 
higher audit fees, lending support to the view that auditor switching for opinion shopping 
results in impaired independence. The results are robust in a battery of sensitivity checks, 
including propensity score matching for the control for potential existence of endogeneity. 
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This study contributes in the following ways. First, this study contributes to the 
literature on opinion shopping and audit quality. While the empirical evidence of opinion 
shopping is dated, we document the evidence of successful opinion shopping and its 
consequences in recent audit environment by applying Lennox’s (2000) innovative method 
which has been rarely used in subsequent studies. More importantly, since the prior studies 
solely focus on the audit opinion as the outcome of shopping efforts, there is no evidence on 
how opinion shopping behavior is related to the successor auditors’ audit quality and audit fee 
pricing. We fill this gap by documenting that auditor switching for opinion shopping causes 
not only an improved audit opinion but also poor audit quality in the subsequent year, despite 
higher audit fees paid to the successor auditor. This finding contrasts with the result of Lu 
(2006) who analytically shows that the successor auditor’s independence is not compromised 
by opinion shopping and that the successor auditor’s audit quality exceeds the predecessor 
auditor’s audit quality.  
Second, this study contributes to various interested parties. For regulators, the finding 
of this study is consistent with their concern that auditor switching for opinion shopping may 
impair auditor independence. Therefore, this study highlights the need to develop 
mechanisms that aid in curbing the clients’ tendency to engage in opinion shopping, such as a 
policy of mandatory auditor rotation or retention to certain clients, or other mechanisms that 
discipline excessive client pressure. The finding also provides important implications for 
investors and audit committee members by showing that the reliability of financial reporting 
quality can be hampered by auditor switching for opinion shopping. Finally, our results 
suggest that the practicing auditors should take extra precautions in accepting clients that are 
likely to engage in opinion shopping because the resulting deteriorated audit quality could 
lead to greater litigation risk in the future. 
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The next section discusses related literature and hypothesis development. The third 
section explains sample selection and research design. The fourth section discusses the 
descriptive statistics, main empirical results, and the results of sensitivity tests and other 
analyses. The final section concludes. 
 
II. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Going concern Audit opinion and Opinion Shopping 
According to Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 59, auditors have a 
responsibility to evaluate whether there is substantial doubt regarding an entity’s ability to 
continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed one year from the 
date of the financial statements, as part of every audit engagement. SAS 59 identifies various 
negative trends or conditions that may be indicative of a going concern problem. If auditors 
possess substantial doubt based on knowledge obtained from audit procedures, they need to 
consider management’s plans to improve the company’s financial situation. If substantial 
doubt remains about their client’s ability to continue as a going concern after considering 
management’s plans, then auditors are required to issue a going concern report. 
Since a going concern audit opinion (GCO hereafter) can induce various adverse 
consequences such as negative market reaction, rating downgrade, and difficulty in raising 
new capital, audit clients may have incentives to avoid a GCO. Unfavorable audit opinions 
might be avoided through strategic auditor switching which is known as opinion shopping. 
Prior studies show that clients tend to switch auditors after receiving non-clean audit opinions 
(Carcello and Neal 2003; Chow and Rice 1982; Geiger et al. 1998).5 Studies also find that 
there exist some actual auditor switches that appear to be related to opinion shopping 
                                           
5 In addition, the threat of auditor switch itself, without accompanying actual switch, may influence audit 
opinions of incumbent auditors who fear dismissal by clients and the resulting loss of economic rent (Dye 1991).  
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(Archambeault and DeZoort 2001; Smith 1986).6 However, prior studies indicate that clients 
that switched auditors after receiving a non-clean opinion do not receive improved opinions 
from successor auditors in the year following auditor switch (Chow and Rice 1982; Krishnan 
1994; Krishnan and Stephens 1995). This finding can be interpreted as either auditor 
switching being unrelated to opinion shopping or the attempts of opinion shopping being 
unsuccessful due to the inand independence of external auditors. Consistent with the latter 
interpretation, Lu (2006) theoretically demonstrates that neither the threat to switch auditor 
nor opinion shopping impairs both the predecessor auditor’s and successor auditor’s 
independence.  
In contrast to the abovementioned studies, Lennox (2000) argues that pre-switch 
opinions are poor proxies for the unobserved opinions that clients would have received had 
they made opposite switch decisions. Instead of comparing pre- and post-switch opinions, he 
develops an audit reporting model to predict the unobserved audit opinions using UK firms 
over 1988-1994 and tests their effect on clients’ auditor switching decisions. He finds that 
clients would have received unfavorable opinions more often had they made opposite switch 
decision, suggesting that clients tend to switch (not to switch) auditors when they expect 
more favorable audit opinions from new auditors (incumbent) auditors. Using US firms over 
1996-1998 and the same methodology, Lennox (2002) finds similar results. Therefore, unlike 
the previous studies, Lennox (2000; 2002) suggests that clients successfully engage in 
opinion shopping. 
Opinion Shopping Behavior in Recent Audit Environment 
As discussed above, empirical results of prior research on the opinion shopping 
                                           
6 Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) select clients with multiple auditor switches in recent periods or clients 
with some reportable events in 8-K report as suspicious switches for opinion shopping purposes. Smith (1986) 
classifies that only five cases out of 139 auditor switches occurred after the clients receive non-clean opinions 
are suspected to be an outcome of opinion shopping. However, both studies do not actually examine whether the 
switches are related to audit quality or fee changes. 
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behavior are mixed and dated. It is unclear whether firms engage in the opinion shopping 
behavior in today’s U.S. audit environment after the passage of SOX. This act took numerous 
steps to improve audit quality and auditors’ independence. For example, Ghosh and 
Pawlewicz (2009) report that both the average accounting-related legal settlements and 
average damage claimed by plaintiffs in securities action lawsuits increased dramatically in 
the post-SOX era. Newly created PCAOB also increased both oversight and penalties for 
audit-related violations. Furthermore, the scope of audit service is expanded dramatically, 
including the audit for internal control (Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009),  
In addition, the relationship between management and external auditors is for the 
most part replaced by the audit committee. The audit committee is now directly responsible 
for the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of independent auditors, who now 
need to report directly to the audit committee. Moreover, the act also requires all members of 
audit committee to be independent (Section 301) and at least one member to be a “financial 
expert” (Section 407).  
From the view of clients, to the extent that greater audit committee independence and 
expertise as well as the separation between management and auditors (especially for issues 
over auditor switching) reduce managerial willingness to engage in opportunistic auditor 
switching, the opinion shopping behavior documented in Lennox (2000) may not hold true in 
the post-SOX period. Separately, from the view of auditors, as long as SOX reforms protect 
auditors (at least partially) from the threat of being dismissed after the issuance of going 
concern reports and stringed legal liability faced by auditors in the post-Sox era reduce 
auditors’ incentives to collude with clients, it is possible that opinion shopping tendency 
documented in Lennox (2002) disappear or at least weakens in the post-SOX period. 
Therefore, we reexamine the following hypothesis in alternative form: 
H1: Clients that predict auditor switching to improve audit opinion are more likely to switch 
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their auditors. 
 
Auditor Switching for Opinion Shopping and Subsequent Audit Quality 
As discussed in the earlier section, auditor switching for opinion shopping can occur 
under the following two cases. First, in determining audit opinions, auditors may have 
different views with regard to the same situation. For example, when auditors assess a going 
concern problem and management’s plan to improve financial situations, they might have 
different views about the circumstances in which GCO should be issued. If clients that 
anticipate receiving a GCO believe that their incumbent auditors have a conservative view 
while their firms’ true economic situation does not necessarily warrant the receipt of a GCO, 
the clients may switch auditors in hopes of finding a more reasonable successor. We 
conveniently call this possible case ‘switching for a different view.’ 7  
Alternatively, the clients may switch auditors because auditors may react differently 
in response to client pressure. For example, when the incumbent auditor is not susceptible to 
the client pressure, the client may have an incentive to switch auditors in hopes of finding a 
more pliable auditor. In this case, auditor switching is motivated by the client’s desire for 
appointing a less independent auditor who is more likely to yield to client pressure to issue a 
clean opinion. We call this case ‘switching for impaired independence.’ While a client’s sole 
purpose in the first category is to obtain a more favorable opinion utilizing auditors’ different 
views, the purpose of this second category can be broader, which includes obtaining desirable 
treatments for other accounting matters in financial reports. Consistent with this notion, SEC 
defines opinion shopping as “search for an auditor willing to support a proposed accounting 
treatment designed to help a company achieve its reporting objectives even though that 
                                           
7 Consistent with this view, Krishnan (1994) reports that clients that switch auditors receive more conservative 
treatment in the audit opinion decision than clients that do not. He further suggests that while relatively more 
conservative treatment will cause switchers to receive qualified opinions more often, it is the differential 
treatment rather than the issuance of the qualified opinion that triggers the switch. 
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treatment might frustrate reliable reporting” (SEC 1988). 
Both cases above can be considered opinion shopping, because if the clients 
successfully appoint preferred successor auditors, both will induce a lower likelihood of 
receiving a GCO in the year following auditor changes. However, the implications for audit 
quality are different across the two views. Independence is an essential element of high-
quality audit. Auditors with impaired independence are likely to not only issue more 
favorable audit opinions to their clients but also restrict less the clients’ opportunistic 
accounting method choices. Thus, while it is reasonable to expect the lack of independence to 
be reflected in low-quality audits in the subsequent year under the second view, the first 
category of opinion shopping may be more benign; because the clients simply utilize the 
difference in genuine views between incumbent and successor auditors, the auditor switches 
under this view provide little implication of a low-quality audit. Given that it is unclear which 
force is a dominant driver of auditor switching for opinion shopping, we test the following 
hypotheses in alternative form to gain insights into clients’ motives underlying opinion 
shopping behavior:     
H2a: Clients that switched auditors for opinion shopping opportunities will exhibit lower 
audit quality in the subsequent year than clients that did not switch auditors or switched 
auditors for other purposes.  
 
H2b: Clients that switched auditors for opinion shopping opportunities will experience a 
decrease in audit quality in the subsequent year.  
 
Auditor Switching for Opinion Shopping and Subsequent Audit Fees 
The relation between auditor switching for opinion shopping and subsequent audit 
fees may also differ under the two views of opinion shopping. First, clients may be willing to 
pay higher fees to a successor auditor under the searching for impaired independence view, 
because while audit fees that are higher than normal level create client-specific quasi-rents, 
the existence of the quasi-rents provides an incentive for auditors to compromise 
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independence (Choi et al. 2010; DeAngelo 1981; Dye 1991).8 If no fee premium is provided, 
the successor auditor will have few incentives to compromise independence by acquiescing to 
client pressure for a clean opinion. The successor auditor may also request higher fees to 
compensate for the heightened risk associated with the client.  
However, the incentives for the client to offer higher fees will be fewer under the 
searching for a different view, because the successor is unlikely to expect a ‘bribery attempt’ 
from the client. If successor auditors issue a clean opinion under this view, this is because of 
their more favorable perception about clients’ going concern status, not because of the 
existence of quasi-rents from the clients. In sum, given that the implications of the two views 
on the subsequent audit fees are different, we test the following hypotheses in alternative 
form: 
H3a: Clients that switched auditors for opinion shopping will pay higher audit fees in the 
subsequent year than clients that did not switch auditors or switched auditors for other 
purposes. 
 
H3b: Clients that switched auditors for opinion shopping will experience an increase in audit 
fees in the subsequent year.  
 
III. VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Sample Selection 
Our initial sample consists of all firms included in the Audit Analytics database for the 
period from 2004 to 2012 (fiscal year) for which data on audit fees, opinions, and auditor 
identity information are available. We select 2004 as the first year to control for the effect of 
Arthur Andersen’s collapse in 2001 and numerous auditor switches occurred in subsequent 
years of 2002 and 2003. Since the Andersen collapse affected auditors’ market shares 
                                           
8 For example, Kinney and Libby (2002) explain that Enron’s actual audit fee in year 2000 was 250 percent of 
normal audit fee. They suggest that the abnormally high fee demonstrates economic bond between the auditor 
and the client, which impairs auditor independence.  
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dramatically, this change may unduly influence our analyses.9  
Next, we retrieve all other financial data from Compustat and merge them with the 
data extracted from Audit Analytics. The merging procedure results in a loss of some 
observations. In addition, we exclude firms that belong to the financial (SIC codes 60–69) 
and utilities (SIC codes 40–49) industries. The final sample size comprises of 30,333 (29,929) 
firm–year observations that are used for level (change) test on audit fees.10 Due to data 
restriction in computing discretionary accruals and other control variables, the sample size on 
discretionary accruals is further reduced to 29,346 observations for level test and 28,604 
observations for change test. 
Measurement of Auditor Switches driven by Opinion Shopping  
To measure our main test variable (‘opinion shopping purpose auditor change’), we 
use Lennox’s (2000) methodology. Our test consists of two stages: First, we identify whether 
the opportunity of opinion shopping exists at the individual firm level. Second, we examine 
whether the client who has the opportunity to engage in opinion shopping takes advantage of 
it by switching its auditor to avoid receiving an unfavorable audit opinion.  
Lennox (2000) tests the scope of opinion shopping based on the predicted reporting 
differences between a firm’s incumbent auditor and its newly hired auditor. Following his 
methodology, we calculate the possibility for a firm to receive a going-concern opinion for 
both the cases of switching and non-switching decision, using the following probit model of 
audit opinion: 
                                           
9 None of the auditor changes identified in this study are due to Arthur Andersen’s demise (i.e., the auditor 
change from Arthur Andersen to other auditors. However, the auditors’ capacity constraint caused by the inflow 
of the former clients of Arthur Andersen to new auditor may lead to some auditor changes in the subsequent 
period indirectly (e.g., Landsman et al. 2009). However, because the auditor change due to temporal capacity 
constraint is not related to auditor change initiated by clients for opinion shopping, our results are not likely to 
be affected by the possible confounding factors. We choose 2004 as the start of the sample period not to include 
such auditor changes. 
10 The minimum (maximum) sample size per year is 2,853 (3,901) in 2012 (2004). The small variation in the 
sample size reveals that the observations are evenly distributed across our sample period. 
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GCOjt = α + β1ACHjt + β2 GCO_LAG1jt-1 + β3 TAjt + β4 LEVjt + β5 ROAjt + β6 BANKjt  
+ β7 GROWTHjt + β8 BTMjt + β9 BIG4jt + β10 LTENUREjt + β11 GCO_LAG1jt-1 *ACHjt  
+ β12 TAjt *ACHjt + β13 LEVjt *ACHjt + β14 ROAjt-1 *ACHjt+ β15 BANKjt *ACHjt  
+ β16 GROWTHjt *ACHjt+ β17 BTMjt *ACHjt + β18 BIG4jt *ACHjt  
+ β19 LTENUREjt *ACHjt + Industry dummy + Year dummy + ε            (1) 
where, for firm j and year t (or t - 1), GCO and ACH are audit opinion and auditor change 
indicator variables, respectively. An audit report indicator variable (GCOjt) equals one if firm 
j receives a going-concern opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. An auditor switch indicator 
variable (ACHjt) equals one if firm j switches its auditor in year t, and zero otherwise. To 
capture the strong persistence of audit opinions as documented by prior studies, we include 
prior audit opinion (GCO_LAG1jt-1) in Eq. (1) (Krishnan et al. 1996; Lennox 2000). We also 
include the natural logarithm of total assets (TA), leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), 
bankruptcy indicator variable (BANK), growth in total assets (GROWTH), book-to-market 
ratio (BTM), Big 4 indicator variable (BIG4), and natural logarithm of auditor tenure plus one 
(LTENURE), following prior literature.11 We also include the interaction terms between 
auditor switch indicator variable (ACH) and all the other explanatory variables to capture the 
reporting difference between the incumbent and newly hired auditors. Refer to Appendix A 
for the detailed definitions of variables. 
Using the above audit opinion model in Eq. (1), we calculate our two tests variables 
on opinion shopping purpose auditor switch: OP and P_OP. The variable OP represents the 
difference in the predicted audit opinion under the auditor switching decision and non-
switching decision, respectively (i.e.,  1jt –  0jt where the superscript 1 denotes the 
                                           
11 Adopting Lennox (2000)’s approach, we include profitability, leverage, and a bankruptcy indicator as 
variables for representing financial health. We also control for firm size since small companies receive modified 
opinions more often than large companies (Krishnan 1994). In addition, we control for audit firm type 
(DeAngelo 1981), audit firm tenure (Knechel and Vanstraelen 2007), growth, and book-to-market ratio (Lennox 
2002). For detailed definitions of variables, refer to Table 1. 
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auditor switch decision and 0 the non-switch decision). Further, using the results from Eq. (1), 
we compute the conditional probability that firm j receives a going-opinion at time t, denoted 
as Pr(GCOnjt) where the superscript n denotes the auditor switch decision. A firm will receive 
a going-concern opinion with Pr(GCO1jt) if it changes its auditor and with Pr(GCO0jt) if it 
retains its auditor. The difference in the conditional probability of receiving a going-concern 
opinion between the new and incumbent auditors (i.e., [Pr(GCO1jt =1) - Pr(GCO0jt =1)]) is 
P_OP).12 Negative values of this variable imply the existence of scope for clients to swtich 
between auditors to avoid unfavorable opinions because the probability of receiving a going-
concern opinion is lower under switching decision.  
Measurement of Discretionary Accruals 
We use the absolute value of discretionary accruals (|PDA|) as a proxy for financial 
reporting quality. We use the performance-matched modified Jones model (Kothari et al. 
2005) to calculate discretionary accruals. We first estimate the cross-sectional version of the 
modified Jones model using the following model:  
     jtjtjtjtjtjtjtjtjt APPEARECREVAAACCR eaaa ++D-D+= ---- ]/[]/)[(]/1[/    1312111       (2) 
where, for firm j and year t (or t - 1), ACCR denotes total accruals (income before 
extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations); A, ΔREV, ΔREC, and PPE represent 
total assets, changes in net sales, changes in receivables, and gross property, plant, and 
equipment, respectively; and ε indicates the error term. We estimate Eq. (2) for each two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry and year with at least 10 observations. 
Next, following the procedures proposed by Kothari et al. (2005), we match each 
firm–year observation with another one from the same two-digit SIC industry with the closest 
return on assets each year. We then compute performance-matched discretionary accruals, 
                                           
12 Refer to Lennox (2000) for further details on the estimation of OP and P_OP. 
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PDA, by taking the difference between the unadjusted discretionary accruals (DA) and the 
return on the asset-matched firm’s DA. We truncate a few outliers that have an absolute value 
of PDA greater than two. In the subsequent empirical analyses, we use the absolute values of 
PDA (i.e., (|PDA|) to measure the level of financial reporting quality. We use the absolute 
value, rather than the signed value, because high-quality auditors should restrict both income-
increasing and income-decreasing accruals at the same time. 
Models for Opinion Shopping Tests  
To test H1, we examine whether a client switches its auditor for opinion shopping 
purposes. We include our opinion shopping variable, P_OP (OP) derived from Eq. (1), in the 
regression below to estimate the auditor switch model: 
ACHjt = β0 + β1P_OPjt (or OPjt) + β2 TAjt + β3 LEVjt + β4 ROAjt + β5 BANKjt + β6 GROWTHjt  
+ β7 BTMjt + β8 BIG4jt + Industry dummy + Year dummy + ε               (3) 
where all variables are as defined previously. A significant negative coefficient on P_OP (OP) 
indicates that firms would have received modified opinions more frequently if they had made 
opposite switch decisions, consistent with H1. If a firm has a negative value of the opinion 
shopping variable, which means that the probability of receiving a going-concern opinion is 
lower under switching decision, and the firm actually switches its auditors, we view that the 
firm switches its auditor for the purpose of opinion shopping. Refer to Appendix A for the 
detailed definitions of variables. 
 Using the results of this model, we define an indicator variable of the auditor switch 
for the opinion shopping purpose (OS_ACH), which will be used as our main test variable in 
our next set of tests. The variable has a value of 1 if a client switches its auditor in 
anticipation of lower probability of receiving a going-concern opinion, and 0 otherwise.  
Models for Audit Quality Tests  
To test H2a, we investigate the effect of auditor switch driven by opinion shopping on 
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audit quality, which is proxied by the magnitude of discretionary accruals. We use the 
following multivariate regression model as in prior studies (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Becker et 
al. 1998; Choi et al. 2010, 2013): 
|PDAjt| = α + β1ACHjt + β2 OS_ACHjt + β3 TAjt + β4 LEVjt + β5 LOSSjt + β6 ISSUEjt + β7 CFOjt  
+ β8 BTMjt + β9 TACLAGjt + β10 SCHANGEjt + β11 BIG4jt + Industry dummy 
+ Year dummy + ε                                          (4) 
where LOSS is a loss indicator variable; CFO is the operating cash flows deflated by lagged 
total assets; TACLAG is lagged total accruals deflated by lagged total assets; SCHANGE is the 
percentage of sales changes. All other variables are as previously defined. Variables 
representing firm size (TA), profitability, and solvency (LOSS, and CFO) are included based 
on prior studies (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Choi et al. 2010). Lagged total accruals (TACLAG) 
are included to control for the reversal of accruals (Ashbaugh et al. 2003). Both ISSUE and 
SCHANGE represent the firm’s growth potential (Choi et al. 2010). Big 4 auditor indicator 
variable (BIG4) is included to control for auditor characteristics (Becker et al. 1998). Refer to 
Appendix A for the detailed definitions of variables. Finally, we include year and industry 
indicator variables to control for yearly and industry differences. A positive (negative) 
coefficient on OS_ACH in Eq. (4) implies that the audit quality of the newly appointed 
auditor as a result of opinion shopping is poorer (better) than that of auditor with no intention 
of opinion shopping. 
 To test H2b, we employ the change analyses to investigate the effect of auditor 
switch for opinion shopping purposes on audit quality. We need to infer the changes of audit 
quality indirectly from cross-sectional level regression explained above (i.e., Eq. (4)) In 
contrast, examining changes in audit quality after switching auditors to obtain better opinion 
reveals whether the audit quality of the newly appointed auditor improves or deteriorates 
directly. Furthermore, change specification mitigates concern for the omitted correlated 
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variable problems (Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006). In so doing, we employ the following 
regression model: 
Δ|PDAjt| = α + β1ACHjt + β2 OS_ACHjt + β3 ΔTAjt + β4 ΔLEVjt + β5 LOSS_TO_NOLOSSjt  
        + β6 NOLOSS_TO_LOSSjt + β7 NOISSUE_TO_ISSUEjt + β8 ISSUE_TO_NOISSUEjt  
+ β9 ΔCFOjt + β10 ΔBTMjt + β11 ΔTACLAGjt + β12 ΔSCHANGEjt + β13 BIG4  
+ Industry dummy + Year dummy + ε                           (5) 
where △ represents the value of a change from prior year to current year; 
NOLOSS_TO_LOSS (LOSS_TO_NOLOSS) is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm 
reports a loss for the current (prior) year but not for the prior (current) year, and zero 
otherwise; NOISSUE_TO_ISSUE (ISSUE_TO_NOISSUE) is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past three years is more than five percent of 
the total assets for the current (prior) year but not for the prior (current) year, and zero 
otherwise; all other variables are as previously defined. A positive (negative) coefficient on 
OS_ACH in Eq. (5) indicates that auditor switches driven by opinion shopping is associated 
with the likelihood of deterioration (improvement) in audit quality compared to prior year. 
Models for Audit Fee Tests  
To examine the effect of auditor switch driven by opinion shopping on audit fees 
(H3a), we use the following multivariate regression model, adopting approach used by prior 
studies (Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006; Choi et al. 2008; Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009; Simunic 
and Stein 1996). 
AUDFEEjt = α + β1ACHjt + β2 OS_ACHjt + β3 TAjt + β4 INVRECjt + β5 FOREIGNjt + β6 SEGjt  
+ β7 CATAjt + β8 CACLjt + β9 LEVjt + β10 ROAjt + β11 LOSSjt + β12 GCOjt  
+ β13 BTMjt+ β14 ISSUEjt + β15 BIG4jt + Industry dummy  
+ Year dummy + ε                                         (6) 
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where INVREC is the sum of inventories and receivables divided by total assets; FOREIGN is 
an indicator variable that equals one if a firm operates foreign business, and zero otherwise; 
SEG is the natural log of the number of business segments plus geographical segments; CATA 
is the ratio of year-end current assets to total assets; CATL is the ratio of year-end current 
assets to current liabilities; BTM is the book value of equity divided by market value of equity; 
ISSUE is an indicator variable that equals one if the sum of debt or equity issued during the 
past three years is more than five percent of the total assets, and zero otherwise. All other 
variables are as previously defined. Refer to Appendix A for the detailed definitions of 
variables. 
In the above model, the coefficient on ACH captures the incremental audit fees paid 
by clients that change auditors for other purposes compared with ongoing auditors after 
controlling for factors that are known to affect audit fees.13 In addition, the coefficient on 
OS_ACH captures the effect of opinion shopping purpose auditor switch on the incremental 
change in audit fees over the clients that change auditors for other reasons than opinion 
shopping. H3a can be translated as α2> 0. 
To test H3b, we employ a changes specification rather than a levels specification 
(Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006; Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009), to investigate the effect of 
opinion shopping behavior on audit fees. Specifically, we regress the following change model: 
ΔAUDFEEjt = α + β1ACHjt + β2 OS_ACHjt + β3 ΔTAjt + β4 ΔINVRECjt + β5 FRN_TO_NOFRNjt  
+ β6 NOFRN_TO_FRNjt + β7 ΔSEGjt + β8 ΔCATAjt + β9 ΔCACLjt + β10 ΔLEVjt  
+ β11 ΔROAjt + β12 NOLOSS_TO_LOSSjt + β13 LOSS_TO_NOLOSSjt  
                                           
13 We use the term ‘ongoing auditors’ to refer to auditors that audited the same client in year t and t-1 
continuously. In addition, we do not specifically predict the sign for ACH. Although early studies document the 
existence of low-balling (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990;Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006; Simon and Francis 1988) 
which suggests a negative coefficient on ACH, a recent study of Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) document the 
existence of fee premiums in the post-SOX period for new clients. Given that our study use post-SOX data, we 
expect that it is more likely that the coefficient on ACH is positive, supporting the finding of Ghosh and 
Pawlewicz (2009). 
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+ β14 CLEAN_TO_GCOjt + β15 GCO_TO_CLEANjt + β16 ΔBTMjt 
+ β17 NOISSUE_TO_ISSUEjt + β18 ISSUE_TO_NOISSUEjt  
+ β19 BIG4jt + Industry dummy + Year dummy + ε               
(7) 
where FRN_TO_NOFRN (NOFRN_TO_FRN) is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
firm operates foreign business for the prior (current) year but not for the current (prior) year, 
and zero otherwise; CLEAN_TO_GCO (GCO_TO_CLEAN) is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the firm receives a going concern opinion for the current (prior) year but not for 
the prior (current) year, and zero otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined.  
In the empirical analyses, a positive coefficient on OS_ACH in Eq. (7) is consistent 
with audit fee increases for clients switching auditors for opinion shopping purposes.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Tests of H1: Evidence of Opinion Shopping 
Table 1 presents the number of observations used in the analysis depending on the 
audit opinion and auditor switch decisions, descriptive statistics for variables used in audit 
reporting and auditor switching models, and the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression for Eq. (1) and (3). First, Panel A provides the number of observations for 
switching and non-switching firms. We place firms into one of 4 bins (2 x 2) based on the 
intersection of receiving or not receiving a going concern opinion in year t and t-1 for 
switching and non-switching firms. For non-switching firms (N = 27,809), it shows that the 
number of firms that received a (non-) clean opinion in both years t and t-1 is 24,022 (2,225). 
Thus, about 95 (84) percent of firms that received a clean (going-concern) opinion in year t-1 
continue to receive a clean (going-concern) opinion in the following year. Alternatively, for 
switching firms (N = 2,524), it shows that the number of firms that received a (non-) clean 
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opinion in both years t and t-1 is 1,753 (455). Thus, about 89 (82) percent of firms that 
receive a clean (going-concern) opinion in year t-1 continue to receive a clean (going-concern) 
opinion in the following year from a different auditor. It confirms the persistence of audit 
opinion over years as documented by prior literature (Geiger et al. 1998; Krishnan and 
Stephen 1995; Lennox 2000). 
Second, Panel B shows that GCO and ACH are positively correlated (0.12), which 
indicates that clients that received going concern opinion have a tendency to change their 
auditors. It is notable that the relation between GCO and GCO_LAG1 is persistent over years 
(0.71). Additionally, we find that clients that received going concern opinions (GCO) are 
negatively correlated with firm size (TA), measure of profitability (ROA), book-to-market 
ration (BTM), and Big 4 indicator variable (BIG4), while GCO is positively correlated with 
leverage (LEV), bankruptcy measure (BANK), and growth variable (GROWTH), consistent 
with prior literature (Francis and Yu 2009; Lennox 2000, 2002).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Finally, Panel C provides the results of Eq. (1) and (3), investigating whether client 
firms successfully engage in opinion shopping.14 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 are results 
of audit opinion model (i.e., Eq. (1)) without the interaction variables and with the interaction 
variables, respectively. While Column (1) forces the coefficients on explanatory variables to 
be the same for switching and non-switching firms, Column (2) takes into consideration the 
differences between the two types of firms by introducing the interaction terms between ACH 
and the explanatory variables. The insignificant coefficients on ACH in both columns confirm 
the finding in prior studies that audit opinion does not improve after auditor change (Krishnan 
1994; Krishnan and Stephen 1995). The positive and significant coefficient on GCO_LAG1 
                                           
14 Table 5 is similar to Table 4 of Lennox (2000). Note that we use clustered standard errors by each firm to 
calculate the t-values for all regression analyses reported in this study. 
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indicates strong persistence in audit opinions over years. Further, the results show that firms 
have a higher likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion if they have small firm size 
(TA), high leverage (LEV), low profitability (ROA), subsequently fail (BANK), lower book-to-
market ratio (BTM), and shorter length of auditor tenure (LTENURE).  
In Columns (3) to (5), we report the results of auditor switch model (i.e., Eq. (3)). 
First, in Column (3), we report our benchmark model without P_OP or OP. The results in 
Column (2) enable us to construct the opinion-shopping variables, P_OP and OP, which are 
included in Columns (4) and (5). In Column (4), the variable, P_OP, captures the effect of 
opinion shopping intention on auditor switching by using the difference in the probability of 
receiving a going-concern opinion between new and incumbent auditors (i.e., [Pr(GCO1jt =1) 
- Pr(GCO0jt =1)]). The highly significant negative coefficient on P_OP (t-statistic = -17.79) in 
Column (4) indicates that firms are more likely to change auditors when the probability of 
receiving a going-concern opinion under switching decision (Pr(GCO1jt =1)) is lower than 
that under non-switching decision (Pr(GCO0jt =1)). Next, we compute OP, which is the 
difference in the predicted response variable between new and incumbent auditors (i.e., 
 1jt –  0jt)). Column (5) shows that the coefficient on OP is also negative and 
significant (t-statistic = -27.94), indicating that firms tend to switch auditors when going-
concern opinions are less predicted under switching decision ( 1jt) than under non-
switching decision ( 0jt), which are consistent with the findings in Lennox (2000, 2002). 
These results support H1, suggesting the persistence of opinion shopping behavior in the 
post-SOX era.  
Based on the estimated results, we construct OS_ACH. As explained previously, this 
variable has a value of 1 if a firm switches its auditor in anticipation of having lower 
probability of receiving a going-concern opinion, and 0 otherwise. The variable will be used 
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in the subsequent analyses to test H2a & H2b and H3a & H3b.  
Table 2 presents the number of observations for clients that switched their auditors 
depending on the classified purposes of auditor switch (i.e., opinion shopping purpose or not). 
It shows that out of the 2,524 auditor switch cases, 1,004 cases (40%) pertain to those that 
switched auditors for opinion shopping purposes (OS_ACH = 1). The remaining 1,520 cases 
are classified as auditor switches for other purposes (OS_ACH = 0). Further, we find the 
proportion of clients that received going concern audit opinions in year t-1 but received clean 
audit opinions in year t (GCOt-1 = 1 & GCOt = 0) is much higher in for clients switching for 
opinion shopping (83/1,004 = 8.27%), relative to clients switching for other purposes 
(16/1,520 = 1.05%)  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
Tests of H2a and H2b: The Effect of Opinion Shopping on Audit Quality 
 Table 3, Panel A, presents the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in our 
audit quality sample. The mean value of the absolute value of discretionary accruals (|DA|) is 
0.15. The indicator variable, ACH, has a mean value of 0.08, which indicates that 8% of the 
sample firms have changed their auditors. Our variable of interest, OS_ACH, reports a mean 
of 0.03, which shows that 3% of the sample firms have changed their auditors for opinion 
shopping. The mean firm size (TA) is 12.06, which is equivalent to US$1,715 million. The 
average value of the ratio of debt to total assets (LEV) is 0.32, and the proportion of firms that 
report a loss (LOSS) is 42% of the sample. Also, 61% of our sample firms hire Big 4 auditors 
(BIG4). We omit the further discussion on the descriptive statistics since they are self-evident. 
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the regression results for testing H2a which investigates 
the effect of auditor change for opinion shopping on audit quality proxied by the magnitude 
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of discretionary accruals (|DA|).15 We report the results using Eq. (4).16 Columns (1) and (2) 
use the full sample comprising of new and ongoing auditors (N = 29,346). In Column (1), 
when we do not include the variable OS_ACH, the coefficient on ACH is positive (0.0171) 
and significant (t-statistic = 2.73), suggesting that the audit quality of new auditors is lower 
than that of ongoing auditors. In Column (2), the coefficient on OS_ACH is 0.0486 and 
significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 3.52), indicating that the audit quality of the newly 
appointed auditor as a result of opinion shopping is significantly lower than that of newly 
appointed auditors who were appointed for other reasons. The coefficient on ACH is positive 
and insignificant, implying that the audit quality does not significantly differ between new 
auditors who were appointed for reasons other than opinion shopping and ongoing auditors.  
To examine the economic significance of our results, we translate the estimated 
coefficients of ACH and OS_ACH into the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals as a 
percentage of lagged total assets, and calculate the percentage difference between newly 
appointed auditors as a result of opinion shopping and newly appointed auditors with no such 
intent using the estimated coefficients reported Column (2) of Table 3, Panel B. The 
estimated coefficient on ACH, -0.0011, and that on OS_ACH, 0.0486, indicate that, on 
average, the new clients of auditors chosen based on opinion shopping exhibit an 
approximately 122 percent higher level of absolute discretionary accruals than those of new 
auditors with no intent of opinion shopping when we set all other variables at their respective 
mean values.17 This finding suggests that the economic impact of opinion shopping on 
                                           
15 For tests based on audit quality, we exclude observations if the absolute value of discretionary accruals is 
greater than or equal to 2 (Kothari et al. 2005) and winsorize the top and bottom 1% of all of the independent 
variables. The results remain qualitatively similar if we winsorize the top and bottom 1% of all of the continuous 
variables. 
16 The results are qualitatively similar when we use discretionary accruals that are unadjusted for performance 
as the proxy for audit quality.  
17 The average magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals as a percentage of lagged total assets estimated 
from the coefficients reported in Column (2) is 0.0886 for the new clients of auditors appointed for opinion 
shopping purposes and 0.0400 for the new clients of auditors appointed for other purposes when we set all the 
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discretionary accruals is tremendous. 
Column (3) and (4) report the results for income-increasing (|DA+|) and income-
decreasing (|DA-|) discretionary accruals sample, respectively. The coefficient on OS_ACH is 
positive and significant in both cases, indicating that clients switching auditors for opinion 
shopping purposes implement both aggressive accounting and excessively conservative or 
“big bath” accounting.  
We also repeat the analysis after excluding ongoing clients. We perform this test 
because there may exist inherent differences, which are not properly captured by the 
inclusion of control variables in the regression model, between auditor switching firms and 
non-switching firms. Within the auditor switching sample (N = 2,324), we find similar results 
in Column (5) in which the coefficient on OS_ACH is positive and significant at the 1% level 
(coeff. = 0.0542; t-statistic = 3.28), implying that the audit quality of clients switching 
auditors for opinion shopping is lower than that of clients switching auditors for other reasons. 
We omit discussions on control variables because they are self-explanatory. However, we 
would like to point out that all the significant coefficients have the expected signs consistent 
with prior studies (Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al. 2010), suggesting that our regression 
models are less likely to be influenced by unknown correlated omitted variables. The 
explanatory powers (adjusted R2) reported at the bottom row of Panel B are also reasonably 
high. 
Panel C of Table 3 shows results of estimating audit quality change regressions (Eq. 
(5)) for both full and auditor switching samples to test H2b. Column (1) report the results 
using full sample (N =28,604) but without OS_ACH in Eq. (5). The coefficient on ACH is 
0.0161 and significant (t-statistic = 2.19) at the 5% level. It implies that the magnitude of the 
increase in discretionary accruals from year t-1 to t is higher for clients switching auditors 
                                                                                                                                   
other variables to their respective mean values. 
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compared to clients that do not switch auditors, confirming the finding in prior studies (e.g., 
DeFond and Subramanyam 1998). Column (2) reveals that the coefficient on OS_ACH is 
positive and significant at the 10% level (coeff. = 0.0298; t-statistic = 1.87). This result 
indicates that the extent of deterioration of audit quality from t-1 to t is significantly larger for 
audits conducted by new auditors appointed as a result of opinion shopping than that of audits 
performed by new auditors appointed for other purposes, consistent with H2b. Note that the 
coefficient on ACH (0.0052) is insignificant in Column (2).18 It implies that the significant 
coefficient on ACH in Column (1) is entirely driven by auditor switches for opinion shopping. 
Next, we exclude firms audited by ongoing auditors, repeat the same analysis, and 
report the results in Column (3) (N = 2,206). The coefficient on OS_ACH is also positive and 
significant at the 5% level (coeff. = 0.0391; t-statistic = 2.10), indicating that the magnitude 
of deterioration of audit quality from t-1 to t is much higher for clients switching auditors for 
opinion shopping than that of clients switching auditors with no such intention.  
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to alternative measures of audit quality, we 
repeat our tests using restatements (Restate or Restate_AD) as an alternative measure of audit 
quality. We tabulate the results in Panel D of Table 3. Results using these alternative measures 
of audit quality yield evidence that clients exhibit lower levels of audit quality when they 
switch their auditor for opinion shopping purposes. 
Columns (1) and (2) in Panel D of Table 3 report the results using full sample (N 
=27,075). The positive coefficient on OS_ACH in Column (1) indicates that clients switching 
auditors for opinion shopping have a tendency to restate the financial statements in the 
subsequent year. In Column (2), the positive coefficient on OS_ACH indicates that those 
                                           
18 In economic terms, the documented coefficients translate into the average magnitude of the absolute 
discretionary accruals increasing by 1.9% after the auditor switch driven by opinion shopping while the average 
magnitude of the absolute discretionary accruals decrease by 1.6% for ongoing auditors when we set all the 
other variables at their respective mean values. 
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restatements are income-decreasing cases, suggesting that firms use aggressive accounting 
method choices to report inflated earnings in the year of auditor change for opinion shopping. 
These findings clearly suggest that audit quality is poorer for the clients that switch auditors 
for opinion shopping. In contrast, we find that the coefficient on ACH is negative and 
significant in both Columns (1) and (2), suggesting that clients that switch auditors for other 
purpose is less likely to restate earnings later. We repeat these tests using restatement and 
income-decreasing restatement as a proxy for audit quality for our auditor switching 
subsample in Columns (3) and (4), respectively. The results are qualitatively identical to those 
in Columns (1) and (2). 
 Summarizing our findings from Table 3, we conclude that firms switching auditors 
for opinion shopping exhibit lower audit quality and experience a decrease in audit quality in 
the subsequent year compared to clients that did not switch auditors or switched auditors for 
other purposes, findings consistent with H2a and H2b. These results are robust to limiting the 
sample to firms that change their auditors.  
Tests of H3a and H3b: The Effect of Opinion Shopping on Audit Fees 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for our audit fee sample, the results of OLS 
regression for Eq. (6) and (7). First, Panel A of Table 4 shows that the descriptive statistics for 
the samples (N = 30,333). The mean audit fees (AUDFEE) is 6.25, or approximately 
US$1.373 million. Generally, the descriptive statistics of our audit fee sample is similar to 
those reported in prior literature. We omit the further discussion on the descriptive statistics 
since they are self-evident.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 Next, Panel B of Table 4 presents the regression results for H3a which examines 
whether audit fees increase after clients switch auditors for opinion shopping purposes, using 
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level analyses.19 Columns (1) and (2) report results using full sample which comprises of 
both switching and non-switching client firms. The base regression results, presented in 
Column (1), show that the coefficient on ACH is positive and insignificant, a finding 
consistent with Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) in which the extent of lowballing declined 
following SOX. Column (2) includes OS_ACH, the ‘auditor switch for opinion shopping 
purpose’ variable, and presents results of Eq. (7). The coefficient on OS_ACH is 0.0559 and 
significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.11), indicating that clients switching auditors for 
opinion shopping pay higher audit fees relative to clients switching auditors for other 
purposes. Based on the coefficient estimate in Column (2), auditors appointed for opinion 
shopping earn an average of 6% higher fees than other new auditors who are appointed for 
other purposes.20 This result is consistent with a positive relation between auditor switch 
driven by opinion shopping and audit fees, as proposed by H3b. Note that the coefficient on 
ACH is insignificant consistently in Column (2). 
 We repeat the above analyses using auditor switching sample (N = 2,524) and present 
the results in Column (3). It shows that the coefficient on OS_ACH is 0.1230 and significant 
at the 1% level (t-statistic = 3.56), indicating that clients switching auditors with an 
expectation to receive more favorable opinions pay significantly higher audit fees 
(approximately 13%) than firms that change auditors with no intention of opinion shopping. 
This result provides further support for H2a that auditor switches driven by opinion shopping 
lead to increased audit fees. Although we omit detailed discussions on control variables, all 
the significant coefficients have the expected signs. The explanatory powers (adjusted R2) 
reported at the bottom row of Panel A show that they are at least 82%, suggesting that our 
                                           
19 For tests based on audit fee, we winsorize the top and bottom 1% of all of the continuous variables to 
alleviate the effect of outliers. 
20 The effect is computed by using the coefficient estimate on variable OS_ACH in Column (2) of Table 4, 
Panel B, (0.0559), as follows. The effect = 100 * [exp(0.0682) – 1] ≈ 5.75. 
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empirical models explain the audit fees reasonably well.  
 Similar to Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006), we employ a changes specification to 
investigate whether auditor changes driven by opinion shopping lead to audit fee increases 
from year t-1 to year t. We report the regression results of changes in audit fees using Eq. (7) 
in Panel C of Table 4. In Column (1), when we use full model (N = 29,929), we find that the 
coefficient on ACH, without OS_ACH variable in the regression model, is insignificant. 
Column (2) presents results of the full model of Eq. (8). The coefficient on OS_ACH 
continues to be positive and significant at the 5% level (coeff. = 0.0988; t-statistic = 2.14). 
Our results suggest that after controlling for changes in firm-level characteristics, audit fees 
for clients changing auditors for opinion shopping increase an additional 10% relative to 
audit fees for clients switching auditors for other reasons. The result is consistent with H3b. 
Column (3), which focuses only on firms that switch their auditors (N = 2,472), shows that 
the coefficient on OS_ACH is positive and significant (t-statistic = 1.67) at the 10% level. It 
implies that the incoming auditors selected for opinion shopping purposes increase audit fees 
relative to what the predecessor auditors charged, and the number is about 8% higher than 
what the incoming auditors charge clients with no intention of opinion shopping.  
Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent with the notion that auditor change 
driven by opinion shopping increases audit fees, supporting H3a and H3b.21 
Sensitivity Tests 
 We repeat our analyses using various settings to examine the robustness of 
our findings. First, we conduct the same tests after omitting auditor switches that are deemed 
                                           
21 In an alternative view, auditor may charge higher fees for the clients who switch auditors for opinion 
shopping purpose to increase the scope of audit. If auditors are aware of the risk related to such clients, they 
may extend the scope of audit to minimize the potential audit risk of issuing clean opinion for the clients and the 
increased level of efforts leads to higher audit fees. However, our empirical results on the analyses for audit 
quality do not support this view. If auditors extend the scope of audit, the audit quality is expected to increase 
(e.g., Caramanis and Lennox 2008; Kwon and Ki 2011) but our empirical results suggest the audit quality 
deterioration after opinion shopping purpose auditor switches.  
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unrelated to opinion shopping. For this purpose, we remove auditor switches due to auditor 
resignations (N = 734) because auditor resignation could be driven by auditor-client 
misalignment or a change in a client’s litigation risk (Johnson and Lys 1990; Landsman et al. 
2009; Shu 2000). We report the results in Panel A of Table 5.22 To conserve space, we only 
report the coefficients for ACH and OS_ACH. The regression results of the audit quality 
model using Eq. (4), the coefficient on OS_ACH is positive and significant at the 1% level 
when using full sample (coeff. = 0.0975; t-statistic = 2.96) in Column (1) and when using 
auditor switching sample (coeff. = 0.2259; t-statistic = 4.25) in Column (2). These results 
indicate that clients that switched auditors for opinion shopping opportunities exhibit lower 
audit quality than clients that did not switch auditors or switched auditors for other purposes. 
The audit fee regression results in Column (3) and (4) are consistent with clients appointing 
auditors for opinion shopping paying significantly higher audit fees. Although not tabulated 
separately, the results of change regressions are qualitatively identical.  Second, we follow 
prior literature by restricting our sample to financially distressed firms as defined in DeFond 
et al. (2002) and Francis and Yu (2009). We rerun our audit quality and audit fee tests and 
report the results in Table 5, Panel B. We continue to find that the coefficient on OS_ACH is 
positive and significant under both criteria of financially distressed firms (reporting a loss and 
belonging in the lowest 25% of equity). Although not tabulated separately, the results of 
change regressions are qualitatively identical. 
Third, we conduct additional test by employing non-switching firms. After receiving 
GCO from incumbent auditors in a year, some firms decide not to switch their respective 
auditors because they believe that they are more likely to receive clean opinions in next year 
from the incumbent auditor than from new auditor. We check if audit quality and fees differ 
                                           
22 Throughout Table 5, we report the results of Eq. (4) only for the simplicity when we analyze audit quality. We 
assure that the results using other analyses are qualitatively the same. 
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for these firms. In empirical analyses with available sample, we find that audit quality is 
higher and audit fees are lower for these firms than other firms that do not receive GCO in a 
prior year. The finding clearly reveals the deteriorated audit quality and increased audit fees 
after auditor switches for opinion shopping. 
Fourth, we repeat empirical analyses after replacing audit fees in Eqs. (6) and (7) for 
total fees (= sum of audit and non-audit fees) because opinion shopping clients may pay 
higher non-audit fees, rather than audit fees, in return for the clean opinion to their new 
auditor. The empirical results are qualitatively identical to those tabulated previously. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Controls for Endogeneity using Propensity Score Matching 
Additionally, to provide comfort that our results are not driven by endogeneity, we 
use the propensity score matching approach to minimize the observable differences among 
clients (Lawrence et al. 2011). We first estimatethe probit regression to model the probability 
of switching an auditor, using several of the audit-firm characteristics used in our auditor 
switching model. We then match each new client with opinion shopping purposes, one-to-one, 
with other new clients that switch auditors for other reasons than opinion shopping and 
ongoing clients with the closest propensity score without replacement within a maximum 
caliper distance of 5 percent.23 As a result, for both the audit quality and audit fee analyses, 
we successfully match 876 and 1,001 cases of auditor change driven by opinion shopping out 
of 1,004 observations with the equal number of the other auditor change and ongoing auditor 
                                           
23 Specifically, we estimate the probability of switching auditors for opinion shopping purposes by regressing 
OS_ACH, the auditor switch for opinion shopping purpose variable, on a set of firm characteristics to influence 
audit fees and audit quality in the following probit models, respectively:  
OS_ACHjt = β0 + β3 TAjt + β4 INVRECjt + β5 FOREIGNjt + β6 SEGjt + β7 CATAjt + β8 CACLjt + β9 LEVjt  
+ β10 ROAjt + β11 LOSSjt + β12 GCOjt + β13 BTMjt+ β14 ISSUEjt + β15 BIG4jt  
+ Industry dummy + Year dummy + εjt,  
OS_ACHjt = β0 + β1 TAjt + β2 LEVjt + β3 LOSSjt + β4 ISSUEjt + β5 CFOjt + β6 BTMjt + β7 TACLAGjt  
+ β8 SCHANGEjt + β9 BIG4jt + β10 LTENUREjt + Industry dummy + Year dummy + εjt,  
where all variables are as defined previously. 
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cases, respectively. The results are tabulated in Panel C of Table 5. 
As in Table 5, we find that the results using these matched samples are consistent 
with our earlier findings. Specifically, tests based on audit quality (i.e., discretionary accruals, 
N = 1,752) reveal that firms switching auditors for opinion shopping purposes experience 
deterioration in audit quality. In full sample, we find that the coefficient on OS_ACH is 
0.0851 and significant at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.89) and in auditor switching sample (N 
= 914), the coefficient on OS_ACH is 0.1050 (t-statistic = 2.28). Further, for audit fee tests 
using full sample (N=2,002), we find that the coefficient on OS_ACH is 0.1123 and 
insignificant (t-statistic = 1.23) but directionally consistent. Next, for audit fee tests using 
auditor switching sample (N = 1,058), the coefficient on OS_ACH is 0.1585 and significant at 
the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.67).24 These results are consistent with a positive association 
between audit fees and auditor switches driven by opinion shopping.25 Thus, we are unable 
to find any evidence that endogeneity influence our findings. However, we acknowledge that 
we never solve this issue completely. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we provide compelling evidence on the economic consequences of 
auditor changes driven by opinion shopping. While prior studies examine the issue using a 
noisy measure by comparing observed audit opinions before and after firms change auditors, 
we employ Lennox’s (2000) methodology which enables us to more accurately identify cases 
                                           
24 Although they are not separately tabulated, the results of change regression analyses are qualitatively the 
same as those tabulated. 
25 We also match all new clients with ongoing clients (N = 4,680 and 5,046 in both the audit quality and audit 
fee tests, respectively) and find similar results. For example, for audit quality test using full sample, we find that 
the coefficient on OS_ACH is 0.0426 and significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 2.90) and for audit quality tests 
using auditor switching sample, the coefficient on OS_ACH is 0.0533 and significant at the 1% level (t-statistic 
= 3.22). Additionally, for audit fee tests using full sample, we find that the coefficient on OS_ACH is 0.0816 and 
significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 2.78) and for audit fee tests using auditor switching sample, the 
coefficient on OS_ACH is 0.1234 and significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 3.57). 
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of opinion shopping by predicting the opinions both switching and non-switching firms 
would have received had they made opposite decisions. Using these data, we find that clients 
that switch auditors for opinion shopping exhibit significantly lower audit quality than those 
that do not engage in opinion shopping. Further, the deterioration in audit quality is 
accompanied with higher audit fees. We perform change analyses and subsample tests and 
find that the results support the detrimental consequences of opinion shopping. 
This study contributes to the literature and practitioners in the following ways. First, 
this study contributes to the literature on opinion shopping by documenting the evidence of 
successful opinion shopping and its consequences in recent audit environment using 
Lennox’s (2000) innovative method which has been rarely used in subsequent studies. More 
importantly, we fill the void in the literature by documenting that auditor switching for 
opinion shopping causes not only an improved audit opinion but also poor audit quality in the 
subsequent year, despite higher audit fees paid to the successor auditor. Second, this study 
contributes to various interested parties. For regulators, the finding of this study is consistent 
with their concern that auditor switching for opinion shopping may impair auditor 
independence. Therefore, this study highlights the need to develop mechanisms that aid in 
curbing the clients’ tendency to engage in opinion shopping, such as a policy of mandatory 
auditor rotation or retention to certain clients, or other mechanisms that discipline excessive 
client pressure. The finding also provides important implications for investors by showing 
that the reliability of audit opinions and audit quality can be hampered by auditor switching 
for opinion shopping.  
However, as long as the auditor switching models in Lennox (2000) base its 
predictions on a set of fixed firm variables, potential measurement errors could remain and 
influence our findings. This paper thus calls for more efforts to fine-tune these models. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Part A. Audit opinion and auditor change model 
Variable Name Definition 
GCO 
 
Indicator variable that equals one if a firm receives a going concern opinion in the 
current year, and zero otherwise; 
GCO_LAG1 
 
Indicator variable that equals one if a firm receives a going concern opinion in the 
prior year, and zero otherwise; 
ACH Indicator variable that equals one if a firm changes its auditor, and zero otherwise; 
P_OP 
 
Opinion shopping variable which indicates the difference between predicted 
going concern opinion probabilities under switching and non-switching decision; 
OP 
 
Opinion shopping variable which indicates the difference between predicted 
going concern opinion under switching and non-switching decision; 
TA Natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars; 
LEV Ratio of debt to total assets; 
ROA Ratio of net income to total assets; 
BANK 
Indicator variable that equals one if bankruptcy file date is within 1 year from 
fiscal year end, and zero otherwise; 
GROWTH Growth in total assets; 
BTM Book-to-market ratio; 
BIG4 
 
Indicator variable that equals one if the auditor is one of the Big 4 firms, and zero 
otherwise; 
LTENURE Natural logarithm of auditor tenure plus one; 
 
 
Part B. Audit quality model 
Variable Name Definition 
|DA| Absolute value of performance-matched abnormal accruals as measured by Kothari 
et al.’s (2005) method; 
OS_ACH Indicator variable that equals one if a firm changes its auditor for the opinion 
shopping purpose, and zero otherwise. To estimate the opinion shopping purpose 
auditor change, we follow Lennox (2000) methodology. If the probability to receive 
a going-concern audit opinion is lower under auditor switching decision than under 
non-switching decision (P_OPjt is negative), and the firm changes its auditor, we 
view that it is the auditor change for opinion shopping; 
LOSS Indicator variable that equals one if a firm reports a net loss, and zero otherwise; 
ISSUE Indicator variable that equals one if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 
three years is more than five percent of the total assets, and zero otherwise; 
CFO Operating cash flows, taken from the cash flow statement, deflated by lagged total 
assets; 
TACLAG One-year lagged total accruals. Accruals are defined as income before extraordinary 
items minus operating cash flows from the statement of cash flow deflated by 
lagged total assets; 
SCHANGE Percentage change in sales between the current year and the prior year. 
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LOSS_TO_NOLOSS Indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports a loss for the prior year but not 
for the current year, and zero otherwise; 
NOLOSS_TO_LOSS Indicator variable that equals one if a firm reports a loss for the current year but not 
for the prior year, and zero otherwise; 
NOISSUE_TO_ISSUE Indicator variable that equals one if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 
three years is more than five percent of the total assets for the current year but not 
for the prior year, and zero otherwise; 
ISSUE_TO_NOISSUE Indicator variable that equals one if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 
three years is more than five percent of the total assets for the prior year but not for 
the current year, and zero otherwise; 
RESTATE Indicator variable that equals one if a firm subsequently had to restate the fiscal 
year’s financial statements reports, and zero otherwise; 
RESTATE_AD Indicator variable that equals one if the restatement is income-decreasing one; 
VOLATILITY Standard deviation of the residual from the market model over the fiscal year; 
MERGER Indicator variable that equals one if a firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition, 
and zero otherwise; 
SEG Natural log of the number of business segments; 
FOREIGN Indicator variable that equals one if a firm operates foreign business, and zero 
otherwise; 
INVREC Sum of inventories and receivables divided by total assets; 
RETURN Compounded stock return over the fiscal year; 
 
Part C. Audit fee model 
Variable Name Definition 
AUDFEE Natural log of audit fee in thousands of U.S. dollars; 
CATA Ratio of year-end current assets to total assets; 
CACL Ratio of year-end current assets to current liabilities; 
FRN_TO_NOFRN Indicator variable that equals one if a firm operates foreign business for the prior 
year but not for the current year, and zero otherwise; 
NOFRN_TO_FRN Indicator variable that equals one if a firm operates foreign business for the current 
year but not for the prior year, and zero otherwise; 
CLEAN_TO_GCO Indicator variable that equals one if the firm receives a going concern opinion for 
the current year but not for the prior year, and zero otherwise; 
GCO_TO_CLEAN Indicator variable that equals one if a firm receives a going concern opinion for the 
prior year but not for the current year, and zero otherwise; 
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Table 1 
Evidence of Opinion Shopping 
 
Panel A: Audit opinion of switching and non-switching firms  
 
Switching Firms 
(N = 2,524) 
Non-Switching Firms 
(N =27,809) 
GCOt-1=0 GCOt-1=1 Total GCOt-1=0 GCOt-1=1 Total 
GCOt=0 1,753 99 1,852 24,022 415 24,437 
GCOt=1 217 455 672 1,147 2,225 3,372 
Total 1,970 554 2,524 25,169 2,640 27,809 
 
Panel B: Correlation table for variables used for audit reporting and auditor switching models  
Variables ACH GCO GCO_lag1 TA LEV ROA BANK GROWTH BTM BIG4 
GCO 0.12***          
GCO_lag1 0.11*** 0.71***         
TA -0.17*** -0.56*** -0.50***        
LEV 0.05*** 0.42*** 0.40*** -0.37***       
ROA -0.07*** -0.50*** -0.420*** 0.50*** -0.67***      
BANK 0.02** 0.14*** 0.06*** -0.03*** 0.05*** -0.03***     
GROWH 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.10*** -0.10*** -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02***    
BTM -0.04*** -0.37*** -0.34*** 0.24*** -0.41*** 0.28*** -0.14*** -0.01   
BIG4 -0.21*** -0.37*** -0.34*** 0.67*** -0.19*** 0.25*** -0.03*** -0.11*** 0.11***  
TENURE -0.31*** -0.10*** -0.06*** 0.29*** -0.01 0.06*** -0.02*** -0.11*** 0.02*** 0.37*** 
 
 
Panel C: Probit models of audit reporting and auditor switching 
Variables 
Audit Opinion Model (Eq. (1)) 
Dependent Variable = GCO 
Auditor Switch Model (Eq. (3)) 
Dependent Variable = ACH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Test Variables 
P_OP 
   
-5.5567*** 
 
    
(-17.79) 
 OP 
    
-2.3894*** 
     
(-27.94) 
Control Variables 
ACH 0.0383 -0.1851 
   
 
(0.77) (-0.55) 
   GCO_LAG1 1.8105*** 1.8664*** 0.1399*** 
  
 
(38.74) (34.69) (3.81) 
  TA -0.2724*** -0.2660*** -0.0127* -0.0350*** 0.0242*** 
 
(-19.15) (-17.15) (-1.86) (-5.34) (3.3) 
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LEV 0.0867 0.0896 0.0036 0.0290** 0.0107 
 
(1.35) (1.29) (0.32) (2.48) (0.84) 
ROA -0.1510*** -0.1912*** -0.0024 0.0357*** 0.3121*** 
 
(-4.91) (-4.31) (-0.42) (5.36) (24.01) 
BANK 1.7087*** 1.7138*** 0.2365** 0.1462 -0.4308*** 
 
(12.19) (11.18) (2.09) (1.26) (-3.37) 
GROWTH 0.0102 0.0089 0.0473*** 0.0326*** 0.0218*** 
 
(0.96) (0.71) (5.98) (4.02) (2.61) 
BTM -0.1215*** -0.1232*** 0.0133 0.0287*** 0.0768*** 
 
(-9.65) (-8.86) (1.57) (3.28) (8.19) 
BIG4 0.0085 0.0318 -0.7378*** -0.7851*** -0.8476*** 
 
(0.2) (0.70) (-23.59) (-26.00) (-28.30) 
LTENURE -0.0724*** -0.1125*** 
   
 
(-2.61) (-3.66) 
   GCO_LAG1*ACH 
 
-0.3423*** 
   
  
(-3.26) 
   TA*ACH 
 
0.0053 
   
  
(0.18) 
   LEV* ACH 
 
-0.0006 
   
  
(-0.01) 
   ROA *ACH 
 
0.1278** 
   
  
(2.32) 
   BANK*ACH 
 
-0.2134 
   
  
(-0.63) 
   GROWTH*ACH 
 
-0.0037 
   
  
(-0.16) 
   BTM*ACH 
 
0.0175 
   
  
(0.53) 
   BIG4*ACH 
 
-0.1655 
   
  
(-1.22) 
    LTENURE*ACH 
 
0.2704*** 
   
  
(4.60) 
   Intercept 2.0906*** 2.0844*** -1.3288*** -0.8303*** -1.1072*** 
 
(8.75) (8.51) (-11.30) (-7.12) (-9.00) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 30,333 30,333 30,333 30,333 30,333 
Pseudo R-squared 0.6264 0.6292 0.1156 0.1399 0.2096 
 
Table 1 reports evidence of opinion shopping based on Lennox (2000). Panel A reports the audit opinions 
between auditor switching and non-switching firms. GCOt is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm 
receives a going-concern opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. Panel B reports the pearson correlations between 
the regression variables used in the hypotheses tests to examine the evidence of opinion shopping. In Panel C, 
Eq. (1) is audit opinion model while Eq. (3) is auditor switch model. 
Eq. (1):  GCOjt = α + β1ACHjt+ β2GCOjt-1 + β3Xjt + β4GCOjt-1* ACHjt + β5Xjt* ACHjt + εjt, 
Eq. (3):  ACHjt = α + β1P_OPjt + β2CONTROLSjt + εjt ,  
where Eq. (1) represents the reporting difference between new and incumbent audit firms. Using the results 
from Column (2), we predict the difference of probability to issue a going-concern audit opinion between new 
and incumbent audit firms (P_OPjt and OPjt). For the detailed definitions of variables, refer to Appendix A. 
When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a clustering procedure that accounts for dependence 
between yearly observations relating to the same company (z-statistics are reported in parentheses). *, **, *** 
41 
 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Frequency of auditor switches for opinion shopping 
 
 
Opinion Shopping Purpose  
Switching Firms (OS_ACH = 1) 
Non-Opinion Shopping Purpose  
Switching Firms (OS_ACH = 0) 
GCOt-1=0 GCOt-1=1 Total GCOt-1=0 GCOt-1=1 Total 
GCOt=0 447 83 530 1,306 16 1,322 
GCOt=1 95 379 474 122 76 198 
Total 542 462 1,004 1,428 92 1,520 
 
Table 2 reports the audit opinions for auditor switching firms (ACH = 1). ACHjt is an indicator variable that 
equals one if firm j changes its auditor in year t, and zero otherwise. OS_ACHjt is an indicator variable that 
equals one if firm j switches its auditor for the opinion shopping purpose in year t, and 0 otherwise. GCOt is an 
indicator variable that equals one if a firm receives a going-concern opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. For 
the detailed definitions of variables, refer to Appendix A.   
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Table 3 
Auditor Switching for Opinion Shopping and Audit Quality 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for audit quality model (N=29,346) 
Variable Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
|DA| 0.15 0.25 0.02 0.06 0.16 
ACH 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OS_ACH 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TA 12.06 2.49 10.46 12.20 13.80 
LEV 0.32 0.92 0.00 0.14 0.32 
LOSS 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ISSUE 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CFO -0.09 0.78 -0.04 0.07 0.14 
BTM 0.35 1.32 0.19 0.41 0.71 
TACLAG -0.18 0.81 -0.13 -0.06 -0.01 
SCHANGE 0.17 0.57 -0.02 0.07 0.22 
BIG4 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Panel B: Level analysis for discretionary accruals 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample 
Auditor 
Switching 
Sample 
|DA| DA+ |DA-| |DA| 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Test Variables 
   
  
ACH 0.0171*** -0.0011 0.0109 -0.0148  
 
(2.73) (-0.16) (1.05) (-1.51)  
OS_ACH 
 
0.0486*** 0.0308* 0.0757*** 0.0542*** 
  
(3.52) (1.66) (3.65) (3.28) 
Control Variables 
   
  
TA -0.0260*** -0.0258*** -0.0368*** -0.0154*** -0.0540*** 
 
(-19.24) (-19.03) (-17.22) (-10.58) (-10.39) 
LEV 0.0194*** 0.0193 0.0212*** 0.0215*** 0.0234* 
 
(4.37) (4.35) (3.83) (3.11) (1.86) 
LOSS 0.0088** 0.0085 -0.0333*** 0.0483*** -0.0177 
 
(2.47) (2.37) (-6.21) (10.94) (-1.38) 
ISSUE 0.0044 0.0041 0.0143*** -0.0073 -0.0160 
 
(1.27) (1.19) (2.82) (-1.63) (-1.14) 
CFO -0.0590*** -0.0585 -0.0608*** -0.0683*** -0.0194 
 
(-10.58) (-10.48) (-7.64) (-8.35) (-1.38) 
BTM -0.0088*** -0.0085 -0.0097*** -0.0108*** -0.0058 
 
(-5.21) (-4.99) (-4.13) (-4.52) (-1.37) 
TACLAG -0.0200*** -0.0197 -0.0075 -0.0392*** -0.0145 
 
(-4.79) (-4.72) (-1.41) (-5.48) (-1.52) 
SCHANGE 0.0639*** 0.0641 0.0698*** 0.0607*** 0.0561*** 
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(12.67) (12.71) (9.97) (8.17) (4.42) 
BIG4 -0.0059 -0.0083** 0.0007 -0.0154*** 0.0182 
 
(-1.43) (-1.96) (0.11) (-2.79) (0.94) 
Intercept 0.3271*** 0.3280*** 0.5106*** 0.3440*** 0.7275*** 
 
(11.34) (11.42) (14.77) (9.61) (9.67) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Test for ACH + OS_ACH 
 
8.14 4.29 6.71  
p-value 
 
0.0003 0.0137 0.0012  
Observations 29,346 29,346 13,962 13,651 2,324 
Adjusted R2 0.2627 0.2634 0.3048 0.2856 0.2834 
 
Panel C: Change analysis for discretionary accruals 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Auditor Switching Sample 
(1) (2) (3) 
Test Variables 
   ACH 0.0161** 0.0052 
 
 
(2.19) (0.64) 
 OS_ACH 
 
0.0298* 0.0391** 
  
(1.87) (2.10) 
Control Variables 
   △TA 0.0315*** 0.0314*** 0.0318*** 
 
(7.52) (7.51) (2.92) 
△LEV 0.0521*** 0.0514*** 0.0798*** 
 
(6.01) (5.96) (3.62) 
LOSS_TO_NOLOSS 0.0074 0.0075 0.0102 
 
(1.40) (1.42) (0.47) 
NOLOSS_TO_LOSS 0.0448*** 0.0449*** 0.0522** 
 
(8.11) (8.13) (2.47) 
NOISSUE_TO_ISSUE -0.0358*** -0.0358*** -0.0685*** 
 
(-6.27) (-6.26) (-3.04) 
ISSUE_TO_ NOISSUE -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0578 
 
(-0.81) (-0.77) (-1.38) 
△CFO -0.0484*** -0.0483*** -0.0220 
 
(-5.38) (-5.37) (-1.23) 
△BTM 0.0010 0.0012 0.0090 
 
(0.41) (0.50) (1.33) 
△TACLAG 0.0193*** 0.0193*** 0.0058 
 
(2.89) (2.90) (0.37) 
△SCHANGE 0.0603*** 0.0605*** 0.0471*** 
 
(11.84) (11.86) (3.37) 
BIG4 -0.0045** -0.0054** -0.0468*** 
 
(-2.11) (-2.42) (-3.06) 
Intercept -0.0248** -0.0231** 0.0817 
 
(-2.28) (-2.14) (1.41) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
F-Test for ACH + OS_ACH 
 
3.31 
 p-value 
 
0.0365 
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Observations 28,604 28,604 2,206 
Adjusted R2 0.0930 0.0932 0.1096 
 
Panel D: Additional analysis using restatement as a proxy for audit quality 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Auditor Switching Sample 
Restate Restate_AD Restate Restate_AD 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Test Variables 
   
 
ACH -0.1318** -0.0926* 
 
 
 
(-2.51) (-1.71) 
 
 
OS_ACH 0.2300*** 0.2039** 0.2450** 0.2511** 
 
(2.96) (2.53) (2.46) (2.43) 
Control Variables 
   
 
TA 0.0301*** 0.0265** -0.0220 -0.0296 
 
(2.85) (2.37) (-0.81) (-1.06) 
 VOLATILITY 0.4660* 0.3923 -1.0036 -1.2633* 
 
(1.75) (1.41) (-1.35) (-1.66) 
BTM 0.0063 0.0018 -0.0164 0.0037 
 
(0.40) (0.11) (-0.56) (0.11) 
 LEV 0.0212 0.0154 0.0308 0.0299 
 
(1.25) (0.87) (0.83) (0.76) 
 ROA -0.0075 -0.0108 0.0171 0.0179 
 
(-0.75) (-1.06) (0.84) (0.81) 
 LOSS 0.1035*** 0.0966*** -0.0434 -0.0601 
 
(3.35) (2.98) (-0.48) (-0.66) 
 BIG4 -0.0902** -0.0886** -0.1264 -0.1402 
 
(-2.16) (-2.03) (-1.06) (-1.14) 
 MERGER 0.0638 0.0428 -0.0430 0.0546 
 
(1.32) (0.84) (-0.17) (0.22) 
 ISSUE 0.0149 0.0194 -0.0264 0.0018 
 
(0.50) (0.62) (-0.32) (0.02) 
 SEG 0.0625 0.0509 0.2087** 0.2070* 
 
(1.55) (1.22) (2.00) (1.94) 
 FOREIGN 0.0263 0.0578 -0.0319 0.0313 
 
(0.72) (1.51) (-0.32) (0.31) 
 INVREC 0.0458 0.1370 -0.1178 -0.0658 
 
(0.51) (1.45) (-0.59) (-0.33) 
 RETURN -0.0150 -0.0017 -0.0469 -0.0146 
 
(-0.79) (-0.09) (-0.63) (-0.20) 
Intercept -2.2861*** -2.2891*** -1.5206*** -1.5146*** 
 
(-12.43) (-12.00) (-3.64) (-3.44) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi2 Test for ACH + OS_ACH 9.34 6.40 
 
 
p-value 0.0094 0.0407 
 
 
Observations 27,075 27,075 1,965 1,965 
Pseudo R2 0.0240 0.0263 0.0368 0.0394 
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Table 3 is about the effect of auditor switch for opinion shopping on audit quality. Panel A reports descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the hypotheses tests. Panel B covers its effect on the level of accrual quality 
measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals (Eq. (4)) while Panel C covers its effect on the change 
in discretionary accruals (Eq. (5)). As alternative measure of audit quality, in Panel D, we use whether a firm 
subsequently had to restate the fiscal year's financial statements reports: 
Panel B: |DAjt| = α + β1ACHjt + β2OS_ACHjt + β3CONTROLSjt + εjt, 
Panel C: △|DAjt| = α + β1ACHjt + β2OS_ACHjt + β3CONTROLSjt + εjt, 
Panel D: Restate = α + β1ACHjt + β2OS_ACHjt + β3CONTROLSjt + εjt, 
       Restate_ad = α + β1ACHjt + β2OS_ACHjt + β3CONTROLSjt + εjt, 
where |DAjt| is the absolute value of performance-matched abnormal accruals as measured by Kothari et al.’s 
(2005) method. △|DAjt| is the change in the absolute value of performance-matched abnormal accruals between 
the current year and the prior year. ACHjt is an indicator variable that equals one if firm j changes its auditor in 
year t, and zero otherwise. OS_ACHjt is an indicator variable that equals one if the probability of firm j to 
receive a going concern opinion is lower under switching decision than under non-switching decision and the 
firm j changes its auditor in year t, and zero otherwise. For the detailed definitions of other control variables, 
refer to Appendix A. In Panel C, △ represents the value of a change from prior year to current year. △TA are 
deflated by the prior total assets. When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a clustering 
procedure that accounts for dependence between yearly observations relating to the same company (t-statistics 
(or z-statistics) are reported in parentheses). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4 
Auditor switching for opinion shopping and audit fee 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for audit fee model (N=30,333) 
Variable Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
AUDFEE 6.25 1.49 5.19 6.37 7.29 
ACH 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OS_ACH 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TA 11.90 2.63 10.29 12.09 13.74 
INVREC 0.26 0.20 0.09 0.23 0.38 
FOREIGN 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SEG 0.98 0.43 0.69 0.69 1.39 
CATA 0.55 0.26 0.35 0.55 0.76 
CACL 3.02 3.46 1.24 2.02 3.42 
LEV 0.39 1.16 0.00 0.14 0.33 
ROA -0.50 2.25 -0.17 0.02 0.07 
LOSS 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
GCO 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BTM 0.31 1.40 0.17 0.39 0.70 
ISSUE 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
BIG4 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Panel B: Level analysis for audit fees 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Auditor Switching Sample 
(1) (2) (3) 
Test Variables    
ACH 0.0108 -0.0117 
 
 
(0.82) (-0.70) 
 OS_ACH 
 
0.0559** 0.1230*** 
  
(2.11) (3.56) 
Control Variables    
TA 0.4900*** 0.4901*** 0.4940*** 
 
(102.86) (102.85) (49.17) 
INVEREC -0.0391 -0.0390 -0.0409 
 
(-1.04) (-1.03) (-0.53) 
FOREIGN 0.3210*** 0.3210*** 0.3751*** 
 
(21.16) (21.16) (11.30) 
SEG 0.1354*** 0.1355*** 0.0782** 
 
(8.62) (8.62) (2.06) 
CATA 0.5570*** 0.5567*** 0.5798*** 
 
(17.47) (17.46) (8.26) 
CACL -0.0361*** -0.0360*** -0.0366*** 
 
(-17.69) (-17.66) (-8.26) 
LEV 0.0239*** 0.0240*** 0.0314*** 
 
(4.05) (4.08) (2.62) 
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ROA -0.0470*** -0.0466*** -0.0375*** 
 
(-15.16) (-15.05) (-5.49) 
LOSS 0.1841*** 0.1839*** 0.1931*** 
 
(16.56) (16.54) (6.18) 
GCO 0.1102*** 0.1076*** -0.0054 
 
(5.49) (5.37) (-0.12) 
BTM -0.0160*** -0.0157*** -0.0178* 
 
(-4.05) (-3.99) (-1.83) 
ISSUE 0.0756*** 0.0752*** 0.1274*** 
 
(7.11) (7.09) (4.52) 
BIG4 0.4114*** 0.4086*** 0.3413*** 
 
(23.08) (22.90) (8.16) 
Intercept -0.7920*** -0.7887*** -0.7206*** 
 
(-4.38) (-4.37) (-3.24) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
F-Test for ACH + OS_ACH 
 
2.54 
 p-value 
 
0.0788 
 Observations 30,333 30,333 2,524 
Adjusted R2 0.8725 0.8725 0.8174 
 
 
Panel C: Change analysis for audit fees 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample Auditor Switching Sample 
(1) (2) (3) 
Test Variables 
   ACH 0.0031 -0.0367 
 
 
(0.13) (-1.39) 
 OS_ACH 
 
0.0988** 0.0820* 
  
(2.14) (1.67) 
Control Variables 
   △TA 0.1786*** 0.1781*** 0.1583*** 
 
(19.43) (19.36) (7.50) 
△INVREC 0.3839*** 0.3843*** 0.9481*** 
 
(4.96) (4.96) (3.69) 
FRN_TO_NOFRN -0.0977*** -0.0984*** -0.1314 
 
(-3.11) (-3.14) (-1.15) 
NOFRN_TO_FRN 0.1778*** 0.1780*** 0.3741*** 
 
(5.15) (5.16) (2.76) 
△SEG 0.0428*** 0.0431*** 0.1178** 
 
(3.64) (3.66) (2.01) 
△CATA 0.2922*** 0.2915*** 0.1536 
 
(5.84) (5.83) (0.98) 
△CACL -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0078 
 
(-0.08) (-0.03) (0.84) 
△LEV 0.0167 0.0154 -0.0331 
 
(1.54) (1.42) (-0.80) 
△ROA -0.0276*** -0.0271*** -0.0518*** 
 
(-5.78) (-5.69) (-3.06) 
NOLOSS_TO_LOSS 0.1145*** 0.1150*** 0.1360* 
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(6.43) (6.47) (1.69) 
LOSS_TO_NOLOSS -0.0864*** -0.0858*** -0.1026* 
 
(-7.33) (-7.28) (-1.66) 
CLEAN_TO_GCO -0.0314 -0.0312 -0.0345 
 
(-1.06) (-1.05) (-0.34) 
GCO_TO_CLEAN -0.1381*** -0.1473*** -0.2856** 
 
(-3.73) (-3.95) (-2.56) 
△BTM 0.0147*** 0.0153*** 0.0271* 
 
(3.67) (3.84) (1.71) 
NOISSUE_TO_ISSUE -0.0080 -0.0084 -0.0226 
 
(-0.57) (-0.60) (-0.41) 
ISSUE_TO_ NOISSUE 0.0020 0.0028 -0.0444 
 
(0.14) (0.19) (-0.31) 
Big4 0.1099*** 0.1071*** 0.2572*** 
 
(14.44) (14.25) (4.77) 
Intercept -0.4331*** -0.4267*** -0.5196*** 
 
(-5.24) (-5.20) (-3.57) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
F-Test for ACH + OS_ACH 
 
2.32 
 p-value 
 
0.0979 
 Observations 29,929 29,929 2,472 
Adjusted R2 0.1953 0.1955 0.1317 
 
 
Table 4 is about the effect of auditor switch for opinion shopping on audit fee. Panel A reports descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the hypotheses tests. Panel B and Panel C represent its effect in the following 
audit fee models. Panel B covers the effect on the level of audit fees (Eq. (6)), while Panel C covers the effect on 
the change in audit fees (Eq. (7)): 
Panel A:  AUDFEEjt = α + β1ACHjt + β2OS_ACHjt + β3CONTROLSjt + εjt, 
Panel B: △AUDFEEjt = α + β1ACHjt + β2OS_ACHjt + β3CONTROLSjt + εjt, 
where AUDFEE is the logarithmic transformation of annual audit fees in thousands of U.S. dollars paid by firm 
j to the external auditor in year t. △AUDFEEjt is the percentage change in audit fee between the current year and 
the prior year. ACHjt is an indicator variable that equals one if firm j changes its auditor in year t, and zero 
otherwise. OS_ACHjt is an indicator variable that equals one if the probability of firm j to receive a going 
concern opinion is lower under switching decision than under non-switching decision and the firm j changes its 
auditor in year t, and zero otherwise. For the detailed definitions of other control variables, refer to Appendix A. 
In Panel C, △ represents the value of a change from prior year to current year. △TA and △SEG are divided by 
the prior total assets and the number of prior business segments, respectively. In Panel B and Panel C, Column 
(1) only includes both ACH and firm-level control variables. Column (2), our baseline specification, extends the 
set of firm-level explanatory variables to include OS_ACH. Column (3) only includes the auditor switching 
subsample. When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a clustering procedure that accounts for 
dependence between yearly observations relating to the same company (t-statistics are reported in parentheses). 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Sensitivity analysis 
 
Panel A: Additional test for the sample excluding auditor resignation 
Variables 
Dependent Variable = |DA| Dependent Variable = AUDFEE 
Full sample 
Auditor 
Switching 
Sample 
Full sample 
Auditor 
Switching 
Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Test Variables   
 
 
ACH 0.0305  -0.0689***  
 
(1.44)  (-2.83)  
OS_ACH 0.0975*** 0.2259*** 0.1141*** 0.1320*** 
 
(2.96) (4.25) (3.72) (3.89) 
Chi2-Test (or F-Test) for ACH + OS_ACH 13.64  6.92  
p-value 0.0000  0.0010  
Observations 29,332 1,760 29,599 1,790 
Adjusted R2  0.4275 0.4246 0.8730 0.8281 
 
Panel B: Additional test for financially distressed sample 
Variables 
Dependent Variable = |DA| Dependent Variable = AUDFEE 
Loss Sample Lowest 25% of equity Loss Sample Lowest 25% of equity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Test Variables 
  
  
ACH -0.0094 0.0251 -0.0294 -0.0382 
 
(-0.81) (1.53)  (-1.16) (-1.28) 
OS_ACH 0.0720*** 0.0472* 0.0767** 0.1073*** 
 
(3.68) (1.83) (2.22) (2.63) 
F-Test for ACH + OS_ACH 7.49 6.39 2.63 3.82 
p-value 0.0006 0.0017 0.0723 0.0220 
Observations 12,251 7,339 13,124 7,585 
Adjusted R2 0.2532 0.2192 0.8521 0.8020 
 
Panel C: Additional test for propensity score matching  
Variables 
Dependent Variable = |DA| Dependent Variable = AUDFEE 
Full sample Auditor Switching Sample Full sample 
Auditor 
Switching 
Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Test Variables   
 
 
ACH -0.0438  -0.0661  
 
(-0.99)  (-0.72)  
OS_ACH 0.0851* 0.1050** 0.1123 0.1585* 
 
(1.89) (2.28) (1.23) (1.67) 
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F-Test for ACH + OS_ACH 4.43 5.20 2.03 2.78 
p-value 0.0120 0.0228 0.1315 0.0958 
Observations 1,752 914 2,002 1,058 
Adjusted R2 0.2930 0.2860 0.8556 0.8430 
 
 
Table 5 reports the results of various sensitivity analyses using Eq. (4) (for Columns (1) and (2) of each panel) 
and Eq. (6) (for Columns (3) and (4) of each panel). For simplicity, we tabulate the coefficients on test variables 
only. Panel A reports the regression result for the observations excluding auditor resignation cases, while Panel 
B is about the financially distressed subsample. In Panel B, Column (1) and (3) consists of firms with negative 
net income. Column (2) and (4) is for the firms with the lowest 25 percent of equity of the total sample. In Panel 
C, we repeat the analysis using the propensity score matching technique. When estimating the coefficients’ 
standard errors, we use a clustering procedure that accounts for dependence between yearly observations 
relating to the same company (t-statistics (or z-statistics) are reported in parentheses). *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
